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The labor market situation for elderly job searchers is more diﬃcult
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on a hazard rate model with piecewise constant intensities. We focus
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market indicators as well as the inﬂuence of the previous employment
history on reemployment are accounted for. As expected, reemployment
rates decline with age. Between 1975 and 1995, the negative impact of
age on reemployment chances increases signiﬁcantly. The obsolescence
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pecially for engineering occupations: From age 50 on, the negative age
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly stronger than for other occupations.
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1 Introduction
In many European countries, the employment situation for the elderly is
not favorable. In the EU-15 countries, on average, roughly 48% of those
aged 55-64 participate actively in the labor market (OECD, 2006)1. With
a labor force paticipation rate of 52%, Germany performs slightly better.
In most European countries, unemployment rates are lower for older than
for younger people: for ages 55 and over, they average about 6.5% in the
EU-15 countries. However, in Germany, the share of elderly unemployed is
almost twice as high – not to count those who opted for early retirement
and therefore already disappeared from oﬃcial statistics.
There are three points to anchor active labor market policy: Diminish-
ing the rate of job loss, reducing unemployment duration, and increasing
the rate of reemployment. All three pose special problems when it comes to
old age unemployment: Displacement of elderly employees on the basis of
early retirement schemes is a well-used instrument to reduce over capacities
in the labor force. Generous severance payments (”the golden handshake”)
bridging some months or even years of non-employment until oﬃcial retire-
ment are an appropriate consolation for the early exit out of the labor force
(Buchholz, 2006; W¨ ubbeke, 2005).
Once out of work, reemployment speed and probability are generally
both found to be lower after late career job loss than for prime-age work-
ers (Hirsch et al., 2000). Chan and Stevens (2001), for example, analyze
monthly employment histories constructed from the US Health and Retire-
ment Study and ﬁnd that only 61% of displaced men aged 50 and over are
employed two years after loosing their job. An US survey by Wanberg et al.
(1996) shows that even if the elderly engage in frequent job seeking, they are
less likely to ﬁnd work than younger individuals with the same job search
eﬀort. A study for the Netherlands, conducted by Gorter et al. (1993), also
supports that the low reemployment prospects for elderly job searchers are
mainly caused by a low oﬀer probability. In line with this results, van den
Berg (1990a) ﬁnds that the proportion of oﬀers considered acceptable equals
1 for ages 46-64 whereas it is slightly lower for ages 24-452.
1All statistics of this ﬁrst paragraph are based on OECD labor market statistics for
the most recent year available (2005).
2Bellmann and Brussig (2006) recently presented results based on the IAB Establish-
ment Panel including about 16.000 German companies and come to diﬀerent conclusions:
74% of the establishments did not receive any application of persons aged 50 and over for
their open positions. But if elderly job searchers applied for a job, almost half of them
were oﬀered a job.1 INTRODUCTION 3
A number of studies analyze unemployment duration and reemploy-
ment for West Germany using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(Hunt, 1995, 2004; Steiner, 2001) or register data of the German Federal
Employment Oﬃce (W¨ ubbeke, 2005; Wilke, 2004; Fitzenberger and Wilke,
2004). Most authors include age in their analysis and ﬁnd a negative eﬀect
on reemployment. However, age is often just treated as a control variable
without further analysis of the underlying pattern (e.g. Steiner (2001)).
Others exclude ages 50 and over in order to avoid early retirement issues
(Hunt, 2004). Those basing their analysis on the elderly generation fo-
cus on the transition to (early) retirement and not on reemployment (e.g.
W¨ ubbeke (2005); Buchholz (2006)). Up to now, only Fitzenberger and Wilke
(2004) explicitly refer to the reemployment pattern of the generation 50+
in Germany. However, their focus is on the implications of the extension of
the maximum entitlement period for unemployment beneﬁts for elderly job
searchers in the late 1980s.
In this paper, we investigate age-speciﬁc reemployment rates. Our in-
terest is the reemployment pattern after late career job loss. We analyze
the employment histories of about 113.000 men in West Germany between
35 and 64 years using register data provided by the German Federal Em-
ployment Oﬃce for the years 1975 to 2001. After characterizing the com-
parative disadvantage of elderly job searchers with respect to reemployment
prospects, we add some novelties to existing research. First, we assume
that the eﬀect of factors inﬂuencing reemployment is not independent of job
searchers’ age. We therefore study the eﬀect of individual characteristics,
labor market indicators and aspects of the job career on career from a life
course perspective to identify age-speciﬁc reemployment patterns. Second,
we expect the age eﬀect on reemployment to vary over time and across oc-
cupations. To capture the variation of the age eﬀect on reemployment over
time, we picture how the relative impact of age on reemployment chances
evolved in the last three decades. To identify diﬀerences in the strength of
the age eﬀect across occupations, we suggest analyzing age-speciﬁc reem-
ployment prospects of engineers – being considered a scarce resource on the
labor market – compared to other occupations.
Shedding light on these aspects is crucial in times of an aging work-
force. Additionally, some popular early retirement programs will run out
in the near future (OECD, 2005), reducing the scope for both, employers
and employees, to shorten work life without any cogent reason (Eichhorst,
2006).
Our results show that, as expected, there is a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
of age on reemployment. All driving factors of reemployment display the2 REEMPLOYMENT AFTER LATE CAREER JOB LOSS 4
same pattern for elderly and younger job searcher. However, the eﬀect
of some factors such as nationality, previous salary or education is more
pronounced for the elderly. The hump-shaped relationship between previous
salary and reemployment prospects is for example much more pronounced
for the elderly. Moreover, the relative impact of age increased between
1975 and 1995 (”accelerating age eﬀect”), most probably due to attractive
early retirement opportunities. During the last decade, however, this eﬀect
dilutes. We attribute this to the increasing availability of partial retirement
(“Altersteilzeit”), reducing the need to use unemployment as a bridge to
retirement. Furthermore, age particularly aﬀects reemployment prospects
in innovative occupations such as engineering (”negative innovation eﬀect”):
Between 50 and 59 years, engineers suﬀer more from the negative eﬀect of
age on reemployment prospects than their counterparts in other occupations.
The paper is organized as follows: Departing from a stylized job search
model, we discuss the eﬀect of individual characteristics, labor market indi-
cators and aspects of the individual employment history on reemployment
(Section 2). The reduced form model is then estimated using a piecewise-
constant multiplicative hazard rate model for reemployment (Section 3). In
Section 6, the results of ﬁve variants of the hazard rate model provide ev-
idence about the eﬀect of age on reemployment, the age-speciﬁc eﬀect of
the diﬀerent driving factors for reemployment, the negative age eﬀect over
the last three decades and the negative innovation eﬀect for engineering oc-
cupations. Section 5 concludes with a short summary and perspectives for
further research.
2 Reemployment after late career job loss
In this section, we develop a conceptual framework combining a basic job
search model with considerations about factors inﬂuencing unemployment
duration and reemployment rates.
2.1 A stylized job search model
Our starting point is a stylized job search model involving two structural
elements which is stepwise extended into a four-element model. For an
overview about job search theory see Mortensen (1986). Individuals can be
either unemployed or employed. The transition between the two states is
characterized by the reemployment hazard (or: reemployment rate) λ, which
can be deﬁned as2 REEMPLOYMENT AFTER LATE CAREER JOB LOSS 5
λ = η · (1 − F(w∗)) (1)
Job oﬀers are received at a constant rate η (by ”chance”). Under a number
of simplifying assumptions (Kiefer, 1988), the optimal search behavior of un-
employed workers is described by a reservation wage strategy: Wages follow
a distribution F(w) and concrete wage oﬀers are independently drawn from
this distribution. A job is accepted if the wage w oﬀered is higher than the
reservation wage w∗, and else rejected (”choice”). According to Mortensen
(1986) and Petrongolo (2001), the reemployment rate is consequently the
product of the rate η at which job oﬀers are received and the probability of
acceptance 1 − F(w∗).
This model of ”chance and choice” was extended by Narendranathan
and Nickell (1985). They decompose η, the rate at which jobs are received,
into the rate at which new jobs are discovered and the probability that a job
is actually oﬀered to a job seeker given he has applied for it. Building on
this this three-factor approach, Gorter et al. (1993) mention four structural
barriers to reemployment: Either existing jobs are not discovered (1) or for
some reason, no applications are made for open positions the job searcher
knows about (2). If an application is made, the employer might not oﬀer a
job because the expected productivity is insuﬃcient (3). Even if the job is
oﬀered, conditions might not be attractive enough and the applicant declines
the oﬀer (4).
Leaving out further particulars of the job oﬀer decisions made by em-
ployers and the search behavior of the unemployed, we rewrite equation 1
as:
λ(x) = ψ · Papp · Poff · Pacc (2)
with ψ being the arrival rate of new jobs on the job market, Papp as proba-
bility to discover a job and apply for it, Poff as probability to get a job oﬀer
for the position applied for and Pacc = 1−F(w∗) as acceptance probability.
The model can be understood as a stage model of job search (Petrongolo,
2001; Gorter et al., 1993): starting with the ﬁrst stage, the arrival of jobs on
the job market, the initial rate is subsequently adjusted by the application,
oﬀer and acceptance probabilities3. We further assume that all components
3The four elements of the job search model ψ, Papp, Poff and Pacc should not be
assumed independent from each other. In some cases, they are inﬂuenced by the same
factors: the salary level before job loss might be taken as a signal for productivity and
inﬂuence oﬀer probability Poff. On the other hand, it might increase reservation wage
and reduce acceptance probability Pacc. Nevertheless, decomposing the job search process2 REEMPLOYMENT AFTER LATE CAREER JOB LOSS 6
are inﬂuenced by a set of independent variables x:
λ(x) = ψ(xa) · Papp(xb) · Poff(xc) · Pacc(xd). (3)
Vectors xi, i = a,...,d relate to personal characteristics and the previous
employment history of the searcher as well as to labor market and policy
indicators (van den Berg, 1990b). As for each component in the model,
diﬀerent variables will be of importance, we added the index i = a,...,d to
the vectors. In our speciﬁcation, the wage distribution F(w) included in
Pacc can also depend on a set of independent variables (e.g. to account for
diﬀerences across industrial sectors or time periods).
If one or more of the exogenous variables change after job loss and al-
ter ψ, Papp, Poff or Pacc, the job search model is non-stationary (van den
Berg, 1990a). As possible causes we may imagine business cycle eﬀects,
policy changes aﬀecting the level of unemployment beneﬁts and changes in
the personal situation on the one hand (van den Berg, 1990a) or negative
duration dependence on the other hand (see also Section 2.2).
2.2 Factors driving reemployment
Motivated by the previously cited empirical research of van den Berg (1990a),
Gorter et al. (1993), Wanberg et al. (1996) and Bellmann and Brussig (2006)
who state that the stages of the job search process diﬀer for younger and
older job searchers, we establish a framework of the main driving factors
for reemployment and focus on age-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the strength of
eﬀect of these factors. Whenever possible, we link theoretical considerations
and previous empirical ﬁndings to the job search model described in Section
2.1. Table 1 displays only those relationships between the main driving fac-
tors of reemployment and the four structural components of the job search
model we discuss in this section, without the set of aspects and interrelations
covered being exhaustive.
First of all, the job arrival rate ψ (in other words: the availability of open
positions on the job market) is higher for job seekers endowed with human
capital that is relevant with respect to employers’ needs. But employers also
incorporate worker’s characteristics such as qualiﬁcation or age4 and employ-
ment history in their decisions. Consequently, the job oﬀer probability Poff
into stages is fruitful for understanding the driving factors of reemployment.
4Other socio-demographic aspects commonly cited to aﬀect reemployment are gender,
nationality or marital status. We do not deal further with them as in our study, we
consider them, if at all, only as control variables.2 REEMPLOYMENT AFTER LATE CAREER JOB LOSS 7
will be higher for job searchers with appropriate human capital and signal-
ing productivity. Analogously, educational attainment and reemployment
prospects – or more precisely, the availability of jobs (ψ) as well as the job
oﬀer probability Poff – are generally found to be positively related (Kletzer,
1998; Gilberg et al., 1999; L¨ udemann et al., 2004). However, in sectors with
a short half-life of knowledge, formal education quickly becomes obsolete. In
such sectors, older job searchers with a high and speciﬁc qualiﬁcation might
have lost attractiveness for potential employers. Additionally, (Hirsch et al.,
2000) show in a micro study for the US that the accessibility to occupations
requiring a lot of training is lower for the elderly. On-the-job training is
rare for older workers because employers decide upon the returns to train-
ing and account for the shorter pay-oﬀ period compared to younger labor
force (Eichhorst, 2006). Apart from diﬀerences in human capital that can
be objectively stated, it is a prevailing opinion that productivity and the
capacity for innovation decline with age (B¨ orsch-Supan et al., 2005). The
Theoretical aspects with respect to... ψ Papp Poff Pacc
(and examples for indicators)
(a) human capital and productivity x x
(e.g. workers’ characteristics such as age or
qualiﬁcation and previous employment history
such as previous unemployment experience)
(b) aspects of physical and psycho-social health x x
(e.g. health indicators, unemployment duration
leading to discouragement eﬀects)
(c) ﬁnancial considerations combined with x x
labor market and retirement policies
(e.g. previous salary, size of last employer, un-
employment beneﬁts, early retirement schemes)
(d) labor market situation x x
(e.g. in region, industrial sector,occupation,
season or period)
(e) other socio-demographic factors
(e.g. gender, nationality, marital status)
Table 1: Stages of job search and driving factors for reemployment2 REEMPLOYMENT AFTER LATE CAREER JOB LOSS 8
underlying assumption is the deﬁcit model of aging: A meta-analysis con-
ducted by Verhaegen and Salthouse (1997) shows that not only physical
strength, but also cognitive abilities such as reasoning, speed and episodic
memory start declining by the age of 50. Even if for the majority of tasks,
maximum performance is not necessary, older workers get less job oﬀers
because they are assumed to have lower work productivity and to be less
able to innovate. Finally, implicit contracts and seniority rules might lead
to higher costs for older than for younger workers (Hutchens, 1986) and a
lower job oﬀer probability Poff for the elderly.
An explanation for negative duration dependence, i.e. why reemploy-
ment rates λ are found to decline with unemployment duration (Gilberg
et al., 1999; Wilke and Wichert, 2004), is also partially connected to human
capital theory. In this context, McGregor (1978) lists three sets of factors
that have a negative eﬀect on the probability to apply for a job Papp as well
as the job oﬀer probability Poff: physical and mental debilitation, discour-
agement in job search and restrictive hiring standards. The latter happens
because potential employers take long unemployment durations as a signal
for weak motivation and low productivity which leads to a decreased job
oﬀer probability Poff. Likewise, unemployment episodes preceding the job
loss also might be a drawback for reemployment. Another explanation for
declining reemployment rates over time is given by Steiner (2001): Sorting
eﬀects might lead those with high re-employment probabilities leave unem-
ployment at an early stage, leaving behind job searchers with comparatively
lower reemployment probabilities.
Additionally to human capital considerations and the aspects of psycho-
social health related to long unemployment durations already mentioned
above, health in general is a key aspect of employability. The elderly are
more often aﬄicted with health problems than younger workers. Karr and
Apfelthaler (1981) found that age and health problems are the main inhibit-
ing factors for reemployment, especially when combined. They even seem
to outweigh the inﬂuence of other factors such as educational attainment.
In the context of the four-component model of job search presented in Sec-
tion 2, health problems reduce the probability to apply for a job Papp. If
potential employers can perceive health problems, the job oﬀer probability
Poff might also decline.
Financial considerations inﬂuence both search eﬀort (captured in
Papp) and acceptance probability Pacc. As a general rule, search eﬀort will
be minimized (low Papp) or low-wage job oﬀers declined (low Pacc) if the
expected wage for a new job does not exceed the reservation wage w∗ plus
costs implied by job search. However, we should always take into account2 REEMPLOYMENT AFTER LATE CAREER JOB LOSS 9
unemployment insurance beneﬁt and retirement policies when analyzing age-
speciﬁc eﬀects of ﬁnancial considerations on reemployment rates. First, our
attention will be on high wage earners compared to low wage earners. The
reservation wage w∗ will, other things equal, be higher for those with a high
income before job loss than for low wage earners, at least until the end of
the entitlement period when unemployment beneﬁts depend on the salary
level before job loss and the wage replacement rate is still high. In this con-
text, Fallick (1991), Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) and others show that the
availability of unemployment beneﬁts has a negative eﬀect on reemployment
rates λ. However, reservation wages w∗ tend to decrease with unemployment
duration. When the maximum entitlement period (depending on age, see
Table 4 in the appendix) is reached, beneﬁts orientate at the level of social
security beneﬁts. This leads to increased opportunity costs of not working
increase particularly for high wage earners (L¨ udemann et al., 2004). Empir-
ical evidence presented by Gilberg et al. (1999) showing that earnings before
job loss are positively related with the reemployment rate λ is in line with
these considerations.
Additionally, we now describe the diﬀerences between younger and older
job searchers with respect to ﬁnancial considerations. For elderly unem-
ployed close to retirement age, the motivation for active job search incorpo-
rated in Papp and the decision to accept an existing job oﬀer Pacc is not only
inﬂuenced by the cost of search, the level of unemployment beneﬁts and the
expected wage distribution. Besides work and unemployment, older indi-
viduals can also choose a third option, retirement, when maximizing their
expected life time utility (Chan and Stevens, 2001; Stock and Wise, 1990).
This has diﬀerent implications for low and high wage earners. For low wage
earners, the lack of ﬁnancial resources is a strong motivation for accepting
bridge employment for some years before retiring (Harris, 1981). In contrast,
empirical evidence shows that higher wages earners and those who can rely
on additional unearned income, are more probable to sustain the desired
standard of living even if they retire early (Feldman, 1994). This could lead
to a hump-shaped wage-reemployment proﬁle for elderly job searchers. For
younger job searchers, reemployment prospects would be rather expected to
be positively related with previous salary, at least after exhaustion of the en-
titlement period for unemployment beneﬁts. In this context, we should also
keep in mind that that early retirement options using bridge unemployment
and generous severance payments are much more prevalent in big corpora-
tions than in small companies, which could analogously lead to reduced job
search eﬀort (Papp).
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retirement schemes combined with job searchers’ ﬁnancial considerations
inﬂuence reemployment prospects. As these policies underwent several re-
forms during the last three decades, it is intuitive that reemployment rates
λ have a pronounced period-speciﬁc dimension. Early retirement options
became available particularly starting with the early eighties. Additionally,
in the mid 1980s, the maximum entitlement period for unemployment ben-
eﬁts was extended to successively younger age groups (Steiner, 2001; Hunt,
1995; W¨ ubbeke, 2005). Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) show in great detail
how this institutional reform allowed to use unemployment beneﬁts as an
integral part of early retirement packages. Elderly frequently used unem-
ployment as a bridge to retirement, often paired with generous severance
payments oﬀered by companies. As already stated above, this leads to re-
duced application and acceptance probabilities Papp and Pacc for elderly job
searchers.
The period eﬀect on reemployment rates also reﬂects the labor market
situation. To get an impression of the main trends, Figure 4 (see Ap-
pendix A) displays unemployment rates for West German men from 1975
onwards. In the last 35 years, the unemployment rate developed as a step
function (Bogai et al., 1994). It doubled twice, ﬁrst around 1975 from full
employment in the early 1970s to about 5% and then again in the early
eighties up to almost 10%. A tight labor market might lead to lower job
arrival rates ψ and reduce the reservation wage w∗, if job searchers experi-
ence strong competition (Wilke, 2004). Even if the latter aspect can in turn
lead to increased search eﬀort (captured in Pacc), the net eﬀect of a tight
labor market on reemployment prospects will be negative. Analogously, the
availability of open positions diﬀers across regions, industrial sectors and
occupations. In some industrial sectors such as construction and tourism,
pronounced seasonal eﬀects also play a major role. Reemployment rates
λ will consequently not only depend on the time period and season when
job search takes place, but also on the region, the industrial sector and the
occupation a job searcher aims on.
All four components of the job search model described in Section 2 – the
job arrival rate ψ, the application probability Papp as well as the probability
of job oﬀer Poff and the probability to accept an existing job oﬀer Pacc – are
inﬂuenced by individual characteristics, previous employment history as well
as labor market conditions and policy aspects (both concerning unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and retirement schemes). Our theoretical considerations show
that these factors might vary considerably between elderly and younger job
searchers.3 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 11
3 Econometric model
3.1 Piecewise-constant hazard rate model
In this section, we present an econometric model to estimate the eﬀects of
driving factors such as individual characteristics of the job searcher, previous
employment history and labor market indicators on reemployment.
Gorter et al. (1993) underline that there are two possibilities to estimate
job search models as presented in Section 2.1. The ﬁrst possibility is to
straightforwardly estimate the structural model. Though, as data about the
diﬀerent stages in the job-search process is hardly available, researchers have
to diﬀerentiate between fewer stages. For example, van den Berg (1990a)
estimates structural job search models based on the two component model
in equation 1, involving only the rate η at which job oﬀers are received and
the acceptance probability Papp = 1 − F(w∗). Apart from data availability,
the estimation of structural models needs strong assumptions, e.g. about
the wage distribution F(w).
An alternative approach is to estimate the reduced form of the job search
model, letting the reemployment rate depend on a vector of independent
variables x without speciﬁcally considering the structural components. All
studies dealing with reemployment rates for Germany cited in Section 1
follow an approach similar to this one. We also consider estimating a ”fully”
reduced form model appropriate as a ﬁrst step to analyze reemployment after
late career job loss.
Statistically, the reemployment hazard λ(t) is the instantaneous prob-
ability to be reemployed at time T = t given that reemployment did not
happen before (T < t). The hazard rate λ describes how the reemployment
process evolves over time after time t given that he has not been reemployed
before (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995). Diﬀerently to an ordinary probability,
it can rather be interpreted as ”reemployment speed” (reemployment cases
per time unit, namely person months under risk, i.e. in unemployment).
Equation 4 denotes the reemployment hazard, depending additionally on a
set of explanatory variables x:
λ(t,x(t)) = φ0(t)φ(x(t)) (4)
We thus concentrate on the overall eﬀect of the independent variables
on reemployment without disentangling the eﬀects of the diﬀerent compo-
nents. The term φ0(t) is the functional form how the reemployment hazard
λ depends on non-employment duration t. It is called absolute baseline haz-
ard because it denotes the absolute rate of reemployment cases per time3 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 12
unit (e.g. person months under risk) for a speciﬁed reference group. The
second component, φ(x(t)), describes to what extent the hazard rate λ for
a given duration t for a person with a set of independent time-constant or
time-dependent explanatory variables x(t) diﬀers from the hazard rate for
a chosen baseline group. By means of the duration dependent baseline haz-
ard and the time-varying explanatory variables, we indirectly account for
(negative) duration-dependence.
Following earlier research about unemployment durations, we parameter-
ize the hazard function as a piecewise-constant exponential model (Blossfeld
and Rohwer, 1995; Fallick, 1991) which can be denoted in the following way:
λ(t,x) = λ0(t)eβx(t) (5)
In this speciﬁcation, the time-varying baseline hazard λ0 does not depend
entirely on the data but is assumed to diﬀer between and to be constant
within given time intervals5.
Term φ(x(t)) is speciﬁed as eβx(t) in order to ensure a nonnegative haz-
ard without constraining the parameter space of β (Kiefer, 1988). Each
parameter in eβ indicates the eﬀect of the respective explanatory variable in
x in shifting the baseline hazard up- or downwards. We obtain an estimator
for the parameter vector β applying standard maximum likelihood methods.
As more than half of all persons in our sample experience more than one
unemployment episode during observation time, and Trivedi and Alexander
(1989) show that ﬁtting a common duration model to data from diﬀerent
spells involves a major misspeciﬁcation, we extend our model allowing for
multiple unemployment episodes per person. For further methodological
details see also Vermunt and Moors (2005) who give a comprehensive de-
scription of diﬀerent hazard rate models, parameter estimation and method-
ological problems.
3.2 Data and Variables
For the empirical analysis, we use register data from the German Employ-
ment oﬃce6. Employment histories of 2% of all employees registered by the
5This is a diﬀerence to simple exponential models assuming the hazard rate λ(t) = λ
with t ≥ 0 and λ > 0 being constant over time. The time-varying baseline hazard λ0(t) we
suggest allows for more ﬂexible modeling (Vermunt and Moors, 2005). However, diﬀerently
to Cox’s semi-parametric model (Cox, 1972), the time dependence is not left completely
unspeciﬁed but assumed to be a step function of T and thus constant for given time
intervals, e.g. from the ﬁrst to the third month after job loss, then for month four to six
and so on.
6Scientiﬁc use ﬁle ”IABS, Regional File, 1975-1995”.3 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 13
social insurance system are provided on a day-to-day basis for East and West
Germany from 1995 until 2001. Several millions of (un)employment spells
produced by more than 500.000 employees allow for highly diﬀerentiated
analysis. As our main interest is the age-speciﬁc pattern of reemployment,
we only include West-German men in our analysis, in order to leave out
gender diﬀerences in the work-life pattern and structural changes in East
Germany due to the transformation process after reuniﬁcation (Brasche and
Wieland, 2000; Trappe and Rosenfeld, 1998).
The duration of a non-employment episode can be measured in days.
But simply deﬁning the duration as diﬀerence between start and end of
the period in which unemployment beneﬁts are granted can lead to severe
biases. Job searchers do not receive beneﬁts during idle periods, because
of delayed registering or after entitlement exhaustion. We therefore follow
the deﬁnition suggested by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) and deﬁne non-
employment as the time elapsed since job loss and until reemployment if
there is any, ignoring if a person receives unemployment compensation or
not during this time. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind that non-
employment does not necessarily mean unemployment but can also indicate
that a person directly moved from unemployment e.g. to (early) retirement
or self-employment.
To alleviate this bias, we concentrate on the ﬁrst two years after job loss.
To account for retirement, we censor non-employment episodes at age 65.
Non-employment with a duration below one month is omitted in order to
exclude short term non-employment due to frictional unemployment. The
same applies to short time employment: if the new job is lost within 35
days following reemployment, reemployment is not accounted for and the
non-employment episode continues. Furthermore, we ﬁx the lower age limit
for the start of our analysis at 35 years in order to leave out ”job hopping”
in early career stages. Additionally, deﬁning a lower age limit for the start
of a non-employment episode avoids left-censoring. Reemployment is not
absorbing, meaning that a person can become non employed and reemployed
several times (Gilberg et al., 1999).
For this study, the baseline hazard function refers to the time elapsed
since job loss. It is speciﬁed as a categorical variable (2 to 3 months, 4 to
6 months, 7 to 9 months, 9 to 12 months, 13 to 18 months and 19 to 24
months). The vector of explanatory variables includes time constant and
time-dependent variables from three domains, capturing the eﬀects of the
driving factors for reemployment described in Section 2.2:
1. Demographic variables: Current age, nationality and educational level4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 14
are speciﬁed as further explanatory variables. Except for current age
which varies over time, all explanatory variables are measured at the
time of job loss and assumed to remain constant over time. This
assumption is realistic because after age 35, changes in education or
nationality are not that frequent.
2. Employment history: To account for the employment history before
job loss, the cumulated duration of non-employment previous to the
current non-employment spell, the salary group in the last job and
the industrial sector of the last employer are accounted for. We also
incorporate information about multiple job losses.
3. Labor market and policy indicators: The current calendar period is
included as a time varying explanatory variable to control for devel-
opments on the labor market and retirement policies over time. The
season at start of non-employment is also accounted for to capture
special pattern for occupations with high job mobility (i.e. due to sea-
sonal work). The region of the last employer allows to capture speciﬁc
aspects of the regional labor market.
Unfortunately, we have to leave out health indicators and the ﬁrm size of
the last employer before job loss because the data set used does not include
appropriate information on these aspects.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Age-speciﬁc reemployment chances
To give a ﬁrst overview about reemployment after late career job loss, we
plot Kaplan-Meier survival curves for diﬀerent age groups (Figure 1). They
show the share of people still unemployed (y-axis) conditional on the time
elapsed since job loss (x-axis). At the beginning, this share is 100% for all
age groups.
The survival curves not diﬀering signiﬁcantly between ages 35 and 49,
we summarize these age groups into one. However, starting at age 50, speed
and probability of reemployment decreases. We can deduce this from the
lower gradient of the survival curve during the ﬁrst months after job loss and
from the higher level of non-employed after 24 months. For the youngest
age group, 79% get reemployed within two years after job loss. For ages
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by age groups
their situation: for the upper two age groups, the share of reemployment
cases drops to 29% and 10% respectively.
The survival curves presented above are not adjusted for any control
variables. The relative disadvantage of older job searchers might as well
result from the fact that they are overrepresented in sectors and educa-
tional groups with a low reemployment probability (Eichhorst, 2006). To
control for such eﬀects, we apply the piecewise-constant hazard rate model
described in section 3.1. Current age, nationality, region, previous salary
level, calendar period, cumulated duration of previous unemployment peri-
ods and industrial sector are included as explanatory variables. To make
interpretation easier, we chose a categorical speciﬁcation for the explana-4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 16
tory variables (e.g. low, medium, high and very high salary). The relative
risks for a variable therefore have to be interpreted relative to the reference
category set7. Estimators for the relative risk parameters in β are presented
in Table 6 (Model 1). As we do not focus on absolute reemployment rates
but on diﬀerences between groups, we do not report absolute baseline risks
but convert them to relative risks like for all other variables.
The relative reemployment reemployment risk decreases over unemploy-
ment duration: it drops from 1 (reference category 2-3 months after job
loss) to 0.34 in months 19-24 after job loss. As discussed in Section 2.2,
this can be either attributed to a sorting mechanism or to negative dura-
tion dependence due to human capital depreciation as well as demoralisation
eﬀects.
As expected, the relative reemployment risk strongly declines with age.
It is 41 percentage points higher for ages 35-39 than for the reference group,
ages 50-54 years. The negative eﬀect of age also persists after age 55: for
job searchers aged 55-59 years, reemployment chances amount to only 37%
of the relative reemployment risk for ages 50-54. For job searchers aged 60
or older, reemployment happens even less frequently (relative risk of 0.12
compared to the reference group).
The results for the remaining explanatory variables go in line with pre-
vious empirical ﬁndings and the theoretical framework presented in Section
2.2. We nevertheless consider it crucial presenting the general results for all
ages and relating them to the theoretical framework before further explor-
ing diﬀerences in the reemployment risk pattern for older and younger job
searchers in Section 4.2.
Besides age, other demographic variables aﬀect reemployment prospects in
the following way (see Table 6, Model 1):
• Nationality. Compared to Germans, foreign job searchers experience
more diﬃculties to get reemployed. Their relative reemployment risk
is 8 percentage points lower than that of their German counterparts.
Other studies (Uhlendorﬀ and Zimmermann, 2006; Wilke and Wichert,
2004; Steiner, 2001) ﬁnd similar eﬀects.
• Educational attainment. Having a vocational degree slightly increases
reemployment chances compared to those without any degree. How-
7If ”low salary” is set as reference category, the relative risk equals one for this category.
The relative risks for the remaining categories medium, high and very high salary then
show to what extent the hazard rate is shifted, c.p., upwards or downwards, compared to
the reference category ”low salary”.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 17
ever, with a relative risk of 0.81, reemployment chances are scarcer for
academic job searchers than for other educational groups. This contra-
dicts previous evidence that reemployment chances increase with the
level of education (see Section 2.2). There are several possible expla-
nations: Fitzenberger et al. (2006) and Hummel et al. (2005) under-
line that the education variable does not necessarily correspond, as it
should, to a person’s highest degree, but it is rather time inconsistent,
most probably due to careless reporting on company side. Another
reason could be that the average search time tends to increase with
education (Wilke and Wichert, 2004). In this case, censoring after 24
months might lead to a downward bias in the parameter estimate for
academic education. However, we exclude the latter explanation, as
estimating the model without censoring after 24 months leads to an
only slightly increased value (relative risk of 0.84).
Individual employment history also plays an important role for reemploy-
ment.
• Previous unemployment. Reemployment risks are negatively related to
the cumulated duration of previous unemployment episodes. It does
hardly make a diﬀerence if a job searcher lost his job for the ﬁrst time
or if he spent less than ﬁve years in non-employment. Though, those
having been non-employed between ﬁve and ten years have a loss of
12 percentage point in reemployment risk compared to the reference
group (without previous unemployment). A cumulated unemployment
duration of 10 years or more even leads to a drop of 23 percentage
points. If exceeding a certain level, previous unemployment seems to
be taken into account in employers’ decision making, as suggested by
signaling theory (see Section 2.2).
• Last salary. For the ﬁrst three salary groups, previous salary and rela-
tive reemployment risks are positively related: reemployment risks rise
from 1 (for the reference group with a salary of less than 999 Euro) to
1.53 for those earning 1500-1999 Euro. For the highest salary group
(2000 Euro or more), we observe a slight decrease to 1.41. Low income
earners have no real incentive for reemployment because unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and the subsequently paid social beneﬁt are about the
same as potential earnings in a new job. With increasing salary, the
gap between beneﬁts and last income grows, especially when entitle-
ment to unemployment beneﬁts ends. The slight drop for the highest
salary group can be explained by the fact that high income earners usu-4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 18
ally have more ﬁnancial assets and experience less pressure to quickly
get reemployed. Thus, the trade-oﬀ between beneﬁts and previous
salary based on reservation wage theory we explained in Section 2.2
works.
• Industrial sector of previous employer. Compared to the manufactur-
ing sector, relative reemployment risks are between 6 (Construction)
and 55 (Agriculture, Mining and Energy) percentage points higher for
all other sectors. On the one hand, the manufacturing sector under-
went deep structural changes during the last decades. Reemployment
opportunities are scarce in this sector as the kind of employment the
job searchers are qualiﬁed for often does not longer exist. On the
other hand, job stability might be lower in other sectors and therefore
reemployment more frequent than in manufacturing.
The labor market situation as well as employment and retirement policies
are captured in the variables calendar period, season at job loss and region
(the latter two mainly with respect to the labor market situation).
• Calendar period. Compared to the ﬁrst period from 1975 to 1979,
reemployment prospects are between 31 and 45 percentage points lower
in the subsequent periods. Overall, we observe a decline from 1975 to
1995 with the biggest drops in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s and another,
smaller one in the beginning of the 1990s. This development, as as-
sumed also by Wilke and Wichert (2004), is most probably due to the
tight situation on the labor market with rising unemployment rates
(1981-1983 and 1993-1997, see also Figure 4 in the Appendix). For
the most recent period, from 1995 to 2001, there is a slight recovery
compared to the previous period.
• Season at start of unemployment. The relative reemployment risk
for those having lost their job between July and September is 0.66,
compared to 1 if job loss happens in the ﬁrst three months of a year
(reference group). It seems to be easier to get reemployed when job
loss happens in the winter months than in the summer months (for
similar ﬁndings and explanations see L¨ udemann et al. (2004)). We
attribute this eﬀect to seasonal occupations we typically ﬁnd in the
construction or the tourism sector: If somebody gets non-employed in
winter, the probability to get reemployed latest next spring is quite
high. If job loss happens – for whatever reason – in the ”busy” summer
months, reemployment is less probable.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 19
• Region. Without going into further detail, relative reemployment risks
are lower in regions with a weak labor market situation (i.e. Saarland,
North Rhine-Westphalia or Bremen).
The results described for Model 1 for ages 35 to 64 are in line with
previous empirical ﬁndings and provide a good basis for the more detailed
analysis of the factors inﬂuencing reemployment after late career job loss in
the next two sections. However, van den Berg (2001) stresses that in haz-
ard rate models, especially parametric ones as our model, misspeciﬁcation
may lead to severe biases. For this reason, we conducted robustness checks.
Running a (semi-parametric) Cox model with an unspeciﬁed baseline hazard
rate (Cox, 1972) does not show any diﬀerences in the tendency of results
and very small quantitative changes. The same is true if we estimate the pa-
rameters without restricting the observation period to 24 months. Including
short time employment (below 35 days) or omitting the control for multiple
episodes does not lead to diﬀerent interpretations, neither.
4.2 Comparing old and young: The ”accelerated age eﬀect”
The theoretical framework in Section 2.2 suggests that the eﬀect of some
driving factors of reemployment depends on job searchers’ age. Fitting the
model separately for younger job searchers (35 up to 55 years) and older job
searchers (55 up to 65 years) allows us to identify such inter-group diﬀer-
ences. Results are summarized in Table 6 (Model 2 and Model 3). From
the ﬁrst view, the relative-risk pattern seems to be similar for most aspects.
However, the eﬀect of nationality8, education, season at job loss, period,
last salary as well as negative duration dependence is more pronounced for
older than for younger job searchers.
Two examples show that these ﬁndings go in line with the theory devel-
oped in Section 2.2: The drop of reemployment risk from the high to the
very high salary group described above is stronger for older job searchers
(from 1.51 to 1.03, see Table 6, Model 3) whereas for younger unemployed,
the hump-shape in the salary-reemployment proﬁle is far less pronounced
(1.53 to 1.51, Model 2). As stated in Section 2.2, accepting bridge em-
ployment between job loss and (early) retirement is most often motivated
by ﬁnancial needs whereas higher income earners with, on average, higher
private and public pension entitlements as well as unearned income, are less
willing to accept a new job before retiring.
8For a detailed analysis of the joint eﬀect of age and nationality on reemployment see
also the recent study of Bruder and Frosch (2006).4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 20
Period 35–49 years 50–64 years Diﬀerence?
1975–1979 1 1 no
1980–1984 0.70∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ yes (∗∗)
1985–1989 0.69∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ yes (∗∗∗)
1990–1994 0.55∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ yes (∗∗∗)
1995–2001 0.56∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ yes (∗∗)
diﬀerent pattern? yes (∗∗∗)
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 2: Relative reemployment risks by age and period
A second diﬀerence between elderly and younger job searchers is the
development over calendar time. The decrease in relative reemployment
risks between 1975 and 2001 is much higher for older job searchers than for
their younger counterparts (see Table 2). Have people been growing ”too
old” for the labor market at ever earlier age? To assess if the negative eﬀect
of age on reemployment has been accelerating over the last decades, we plot
the relative reemployment risk for age group 35-54 years and for age group
55-64 years (see Figure 2). The relative risk for the ﬁrst period, 1975 to
1979, is chosen as reference category and set to 1 for both groups. We stress
at this point that we do not compare the reemployment chances of old and
young directly in this part of the analysis. We rather draw a picture about
how reemployment rates developed over the last three decades relative to
the ﬁrst period (1975–1979) for younger job searchers on the one side and
for older job searchers on the other side.
The reemployment pattern over calendar time shows that both age groups
experience the downward tendency in reemployment prospects described in
Section 4.1. However, the patterns start to diﬀer from the early 1980s on-
wards: Whereas the situation of the younger age groups stabilizes after the
two main downturns in the early eighties and the early nineties, the negative
trend for older job searchers continues. Wald-tests show that the relative
risk for older and younger job searchers diﬀers signiﬁcantly for all periods
(at 1%-level, except the ﬁrst one which is used as reference category and
set to 1). For complete estimation results see Model 2 and Model 3 in
Table 6 (Appendix 6). The results are again robust with respect to diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations.
Most probably, the increasing availability of early retirement schemes
starting in the 1970s, partly paired with a ”golden handshake” from com-
pany side, aﬀected the incentive to return to work (for an overview of re-
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Figure 2: Accelerating age eﬀect
the continuing negative trend in reemployment prospects for the elderly in
the ﬁrst half of the 1980s to the labor market policy of this period: ”bridge
unemployment” between the last job and retirement (Buchholz, 2006) was
fostered by the the “58-rule”. It allowed those aged 58 or over to receive
unemployment beneﬁts for up to 32 months without being obliged to search
for a job. At age 60, retirement without any deduction in public pension
entitlements was possible after a minimum unemployment duration of 18
months. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) analyze these policy eﬀects in great
detail and ﬁnd a similar eﬀect of the extension of the maximum entitlement
period in the mid of the 1980s9.
In the most recent calendar period, 1995–2001, we note a slight recov-
ery of the relative reemployment risk for ages 50+. We attribute this to
the increasing entry into partial retirement programs from the mid 1990s
on (”Altersteilzeit”). These programs, ﬁrst introduced in 1991, permit to
9We introduced dummy variables into the model to test the inﬂuence of labor market
and retirement policies for certain age groups. The results were in line with the explana-
tions given above. However, the impact of labor market and retirement policies not being
the main scope of the paper, we do not go into further detail.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 22
reduce overall working time by 50%, with a salary of about 80% of the for-
mer full-time (!) net salary. Most participants choose the so called ”block
model”. This means that they work two and a half years full time and then
reduce their working time to zero for the remaining two and a half years.
The program is strongly subsidized by the Employment Oﬃce. After the
reform of the partial retirement law in 1996, the number of participants rose
steadily to more than 150.000 in 2001 (OECD, 2005). Bridge unemployment
was replaced by the ﬁnancially more attractive block model of the partial
retirement program, improving indirectely reemployment rates. However,
in the end, the negative eﬀect on labor market participation rates for the
generation 55+ remains the same.
The diﬀerences in the salary eﬀect and the accelerating age eﬀect over
the last three decades underline the importance of ﬁnancial and policy issues
on the decision to return to active work life at an older age. As Fitzenberger
and Wilke (2004), we ﬁnd that the policy changes in the 1980s had a consid-
erable negative eﬀect on reemployment of elderly. We additionally discover
a recovery eﬀect during the last observation period, which is very probably
related to the de facto replacement of bridge unemployment by partial re-
tirement possibilities. These ﬁndings are also relevant with respect to future
policy changes: in 2008, the maximum entitlement period for unemployment
beneﬁts for elderly will be reduced from formerly 32 months to 18 months.
Theoretically, this should lead to improved relative reemployment risks 10
as bridge unemployment can be used only at a later age.
4.3 Comparing engineers with other occupations: The ”neg-
ative innovation eﬀect”
Identifying the eﬀect of age on reemployment prospects in diﬀerent occu-
pations is motivated by the everlasting story of the impending scarcity of
skilled labor which recently became a main topic in public discussion about
demographic change. In a survey conducted by the VDI, the German As-
sociation of Engineers, 34% of the 5000 companies included in the survey
consider the lack of engineers being one of the main future challenges (VDI
and IAO, 2002).
In this context, a common assumption is that if industry lacks skilled
labor, e.g. engineers, employment chances for the elderly will increase in
these occupations. But this eﬀect can only become evident if older and
younger engineers are (perfect) substitutes e.g. with respect to relevant
10Not necessarily compared to younger job searchers, but relative to the previous peri-
ods!4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 23
human capital – which is doubted by part of the scientiﬁc community (see
Section 2.2). Additionally, compensating the skill gap with elderly engineers
assumes that they have high propensity to return to employment instead of
accepting early retirement opportunities. Thus, we are skeptical towards
this hope and aim to empirically explore it.
Age group Engineers Other occupations Diﬀerence?
35 to 39 1 1 no
40 to 44 0.95 0.89∗∗∗ no
45 to 49 0.86∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ no
50 to 54 0.37∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ yes (∗∗∗)
55 to 59 0.03∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ yes (∗∗∗)
60 to 65 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ yes (∗∗∗)
diﬀerent pattern? yes (∗∗∗)
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 3: Relative risks by age and occupation
Following a similar approach as in Section 4.2, we estimate the model
separately for the two occupational groups. This time, we compare job
searchers having worked in an engineering profession before loosing their
job with job searchers who have worked in other occupations. As engineers
are mainly employed in the manufacturing sector, we focus on this industrial
sector in our analysis. Furthermore, we omit the education variable for both
groups as most engineers have an academic degree. The complete estimation
results are presented in Table 6 (Model 4 and Model 5).
In Figure 3, the relative risk for engineers and other occupations is set
to 1 for the youngest age group from 35-39 years (reference group). We can
now identify the relative eﬀect of age in each of the two groups. Until age
50, the trend in the relative reemployment pattern is similar for engineers
and other occupations (no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the course of the relative
risk proﬁle). Subsequently, the eﬀect of age starts to be stronger for en-
gineers than for their counterparts in other occupations. The relative risk
of reemployment for engineers in age group 50-54 years is only 37% of the
initial value in the reference age group. The drop for other occupations is
less pronounced: relative employment chances for ages 50-54 are still 53%
of the youngest age group’s reemployment prospects. For all subsequent age
groups, the relative eﬀect of age on reemployment is signiﬁcantly stronger
for engineers than for other occupations. This eﬀect is again robust for the
diﬀerent model speciﬁcations tested (see Section 4.1).
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Figure 3: Negative innovation eﬀect
is stronger for engineers. Coming from rather innovative or technical occu-
pations on an advanced level, they might experience a higher loss of human
capital over the life course than job searchers in other, less ”innovative” oc-
cupations. This ”negative innovation eﬀect” on reemployment might even
be downwardly biased as engineers (and other academic employees) suﬀer
less from health aﬄictions than their colleagues in physically strenuous oc-
cupations. Though, we should not neglect that negative selection could also
play a role: If engineers are considered being a scarce resource, those loosing
their job at an older age despite the protection by collective agreements and
seniority rules, will be probably negatively preselected with respect to their
human capital and productivity. This might be picked up in the parameter
estimate for the negative innovation eﬀect.
All in all, the results show that a lack of skilled labor cannot be automati-
cally satisﬁed by recurring to older job searchers. Late career unemployment
will be only reduced on the long run if the relevant skills of the job searches
do not become obsolete in the meanwhile and if incentives induced by unem-
ployment beneﬁts and early retirement opportunities do not drive out the
motivation to return to employment.5 CONCLUSION 25
5 Conclusion
Our objective was to analyze the reemployment chances after late career job
loss for West-German men over the last three decades. We departed from a
stylized job search model incorporating job arrival rate and probabilities for
application, oﬀer and acceptance. On this basis, we presented a theoretical
framework of factors driving reemployment, focusing on their age-speciﬁc ef-
fects on reemployment. Using a piecewise-constant hazard model accounting
for multiple non-employment episodes, we estimated the reduced form of the
job search model. We incorporated individual characteristics (age, nation-
ality and education), aspects of the previous employment history (salary at
and sector of the last employer, previous unemployment) and labor market
indicators (region, season at job loss, calendar period).
Our results go in line with previous empirical ﬁndings: Whether objec-
tive lack of the ”right” human capital, age discrimination or health prob-
lems: Older unemployed have, other things equal, reduced reemployment
prospects compared to their younger counterparts. The negative eﬀect of
age on relative reemployment starts to be evident at age group 50-54 years
and then further increases. The reemployment chances of job searchers aged
55-59 amount to only 37% of the relative reemployment risk for ages 50-54.
The ﬁrst novelty of our analysis is that we separately look at the reem-
ployment risk pattern for older and younger job searchers. We ﬁnd that
the eﬀects of the explanatory variables are similar, though in most cases
more pronounced for elderly job searchers. The two examples we consider
in more detail, previous salary and the accelerated age eﬀect between 1975
and 1995, show that the diﬀerences are in line with the theoretical frame-
work established in Section 2.2. One the one hand, high wage earners can
aﬀord not to return to employment and to directly move to retirement after
late career job loss. On the other hand, the attractiveness and availabil-
ity of policy options for bridge unemployment as well as early and partial
retirement options strongly inﬂuence the reemployment risk of the elderly.
The second new result is the ”negative innovation eﬀect”. The negative
eﬀect of age on reemployment is stronger for engineers than for other occu-
pations. Particularly between ages 50 and 59, they experience a higher de-
crease in relative reemployment risks (down to 0.37-0.03 of the initial value,
as compared to a smaller reduction down to 0.53-0.10 for job searchers in
other occupations). Even if negative selection works, we can deduce from
this result that the reemployment chances of engineers are not, as often sup-
posed, higher just because they are a scarce resource on the labor market.
Most probably, this is due to the fact that the stock of human capital of5 CONCLUSION 26
younger and older job searchers is less substitutable in innovative than in
other professions because it becomes obsolete much faster.
For future research on the topic, we will incorporate unobserved hetero-
geneity into the model. Occupation groups will be accounted for, partic-
ularly to indirectly control for occupation speciﬁc unemployment rates as
well as occupational strain and health issues. To alleviate possible selection
biases that might inﬂuence the negative innovation eﬀect, we will only in-
clude displaced employees in this future analysis. The weakly anonymized
employment subsample, available on-site at the Research Data Center of the
German Federal Employment Oﬃce, provides excellent possibilities for such
an extended analysis and allows to include additional variables such as the
ﬁrm size of the last employer before job loss.
However, for the eﬀective design of labor market instruments increasing
reemployment after late career job loss, we need more insight in the behavior
of the structural components of job search as suggested by van den Berg
(2001), Gorter et al. (1993) and started by Bellmann and Brussig (2006) for
German data: If the job oﬀer rate is low for older job searchers, the leverage
for policy measures is mainly on company side. If application and acceptance
probability decrease over the life course, incentives and counseling for older
job searchers will have more impact.
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A Policy trends and labor market situation 1975–
2001
In Table 4, we summarize main developments in labor market and retirement
policy over the last three decades.
1975-
1979
Maximum entitlement period for unemployment beneﬁts 12
months for all ages.
Oﬃcial retirement age: 65 years in general, 60 years possible after
long time unemployment (“vorgezogene Altersrente wegen Arbeit-
slosigkeit”, since 1956). Introduction of an early retirement option
at age 63 after 35 insurance years (“Altersrente f¨ ur langj¨ ahrige
Versicherte”). Introduction of retirement at age 62 (1972/73) or
at age 61 (1979) if permanently unable to work.
1980-
1984
Further reduction of age limit for employment disability pensions
to 60 years (1980).
1985-
1989
From 1985 on stepwise extension of the maximum entitlement
period for elderly (1988: age 42-43: 18 months, age 44-48: 22
months, age 49-53: 26 months, age 53+: 32 months).
Receiving unemployment beneﬁts starting from age 58 gets eas-
ier (“bridge unemployment”: Combining maximum entitlement
period of unemployment beneﬁts with early retirement due to un-
employment allows retirement with 57.5 years).
“Vorruhestandsgesetz”: Early retirement from age 58 on is subsi-




“Altersteilzeitgesetz”: Partial retirement possible and subsidized
starting with age 58, but not yet frequently used.
1995-
2001
1996 reform of the “Altersteilzeitgesetz” leads to an increasing
claim of partial retirement (31.12.2001: more than 150.000 partial
retirees).
Table 4: Labor market and retirement policy 1975–2001A POLICY TRENDS AND LABOR MARKET SITUATION 1975–200128
Figure 4 presents the main labor market trends from 1975 onwards. The
seventies were characterized by low unemployment rates (2–4%). Between
1980 and 1984, during the ﬁrst recession, unemployment rates sharply rose
to 8%. The highest unemployment rates of the decade were reached with
9% in 1985. Afterwards, unemployment started to fall. In the beginning
of the nineties, the unemployment rate was again below 7%. From 1992,
unemployment rates began to rise again. The following years were marked
by the second recession which led to an increase in unemployment rates with
a peak in 1997 (12%). After a short recovery in 2000, the unemployment



























Figure 4: Unemployment rate in for West-German men, 1975–2004 (Source:
OECD (2006)B RESULT TABLES 29
B Result Tables
Age groups Industrial Sectors Occupations
Model 1 35–64 (all) all all
Model 2 35–49 (younger) all all
Model 3 50–64 (older) all all
Model 4 35–64 (all) manufacturing only engineers only
Model 5 35–64 (all) manufacturing only other occupations
Table 5: Short descriptions of Models 1 – 5B RESULT TABLES 30
Table 6: Relative risks for reemployment, Models 1 – 5









Persons 113.147 79.851 41.793 5.504 37.395
Unempl. episodes 223.945 173.561 50.384 5.865 48.889
Reempl. cases 136.487 125.214 11.273 1.571 22.965
Reempl. quota 61% 72% 22% 27% 47%
Time since job loss
month 2-3 1 1 1 1 1
month 4-6 0.82 ∗∗∗ 0.83 ∗∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗∗
month 7-9 0.55 ∗∗∗ 0.57 ∗∗∗ 0.29 ∗∗∗ 0.63 ∗∗∗ 0.52 ∗∗∗
month 10-12 0.46 ∗∗∗ 0.48 ∗∗∗ 0.24 ∗∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗∗ 0.47 ∗∗∗
month 12-18 0.41 ∗∗∗ 0.42 ∗∗∗ 0.24 ∗∗∗ 0.72 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗
month 18-24 0.34 ∗∗∗ 0.36 ∗∗∗ 0.17 ∗∗∗ 0.59 ∗∗∗ 0.34 ∗∗∗
Current age
35-39 1.41 ∗∗∗ 1.33 ∗∗∗ 1 1
40-44 1.31 ∗∗∗ 1.26 ∗∗∗ 0.95 0.89 ∗∗∗
45-49 1.19 ∗∗∗ 1.16 ∗∗∗ 0.86 ∗∗ 0.77 ∗∗∗
50-54 1 1 1 0.37 ∗∗∗ 0.53 ∗∗∗
55-59 0.37 ∗∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗∗ 0.49 ∗∗∗ 0.03 ∗∗∗ 0.10 ∗∗∗
60-65 0.12 ∗∗∗ 0.17 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗∗ 0.03 ∗∗∗
Period
1975-1980 1 1 1 1 1
1981-1985 0.69 ∗∗∗ 0.70 ∗∗∗ 0.64 ∗∗∗ 1.02 0.63 ∗∗∗
1986-1990 0.67 ∗∗∗ 0.69 ∗∗∗ 0.55 ∗∗∗ 1.16 0.61 ∗∗∗
1991-1995 0.52 ∗∗∗ 0.55 ∗∗∗ 0.38 ∗∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗∗ 0.44 ∗∗∗
1996-2001 0.55 ∗∗∗ 0.56 ∗∗∗ 0.50 ∗∗∗ 0.89 0.52 ∗∗∗
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0-999 1 1 1 1 1
1000-1499 1.39 ∗∗∗ 1.39 ∗∗∗ 1.48 ∗∗∗ 2.05 ∗∗∗ 1.50 ∗∗∗
1500-1999 1.53 ∗∗∗ 1.56 ∗∗∗ 1.51 ∗∗∗ 2.07 ∗∗∗ 1.63 ∗∗∗
2000+ 1.41 ∗∗∗ 1.52 ∗∗∗ 1.07 ∗∗ 1.65 ∗∗∗ 1.45 ∗∗∗
Nationality
german 1 1 1 1 1
non-german 0.92 ∗∗∗ 0.90 ∗∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗∗ 0.84 0.78 ∗∗∗
not speciﬁed 1.25 ∗∗∗ 1.18 ∗∗∗ 1.69 ∗∗∗ 1.49 ∗∗∗ 1.41 ∗∗∗
Previous unemployment
no previous ue 1 1 1 1 1
up to 5 years 0.98 ∗∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗∗ 1.31 ∗∗∗ 0.54 ∗∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗∗
5-10 years 0.88 ∗∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗∗ 1.27 ∗∗∗ 0.38 ∗∗∗ 0.65 ∗∗∗
10-15 years 0.77 ∗∗∗ 0.72 ∗∗∗ 0.96 0.89
Season at job loss
Jan-Mar 1 1 1 1 1
Apr-Jun 0.70 ∗∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗∗ 0.46 ∗∗∗ 1.02 0.74 ∗∗∗
Jul-Sept 0.66 ∗∗∗ 0.68 ∗∗∗ 0.42 ∗∗∗ 0.96 0.71 ∗∗∗
Oct-Dec 0.88 ∗∗∗ 0.89 ∗∗∗ 0.79 ∗∗∗ 1.07 0.97 ∗
Education
no prof. edu. 1 1 1
prof edu. 1.02 ∗∗∗ 1.04 ∗∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗∗
academic 0.81 ∗∗∗ 0.80 ∗∗∗ 0.61 ∗∗∗
not speciﬁed 1.02 ∗∗ 1.02 1.05
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Manufacturing 1 1 1
Agri., Min., Energy 1.55 ∗∗∗ 1.42 ∗∗∗ 3.27 ∗∗∗
Construction 1.06 ∗∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗ 1.70 ∗∗∗
W+R trade 1.52 ∗∗∗ 1.35 ∗∗∗ 3.82 ∗∗∗
Trans. and Comm. 1.11 ∗∗∗ 0.99 2.30 ∗∗∗
Services 1.29 ∗∗∗ 1.17 ∗∗∗ 2.80 ∗∗∗
NFP and private hhlds 1.10 ∗∗∗ 0.97 ∗∗ 2.57 ∗∗∗
Regauth. + soc. ins. 1.20 ∗∗∗ 1.04 ∗∗∗ 3.17 ∗∗∗
not speciﬁed 1.83 ∗∗∗ 1.55 ∗∗∗ 4.67 ∗∗∗
Region
Schleswig-Holstein 1 1 1 1 1
Hamburg 0.80 ∗∗∗ 0.82 ∗∗∗ 0.61 ∗∗∗ 1.28 0.90 ∗∗
Lower Saxony 1.02 1.04 ∗∗ 0.90 ∗ 0.99 0.97
Bremen 0.85 ∗∗∗ 0.87 ∗∗∗ 0.67 ∗∗∗ 0.93 0.89 ∗
North Rhine-Westph. 0.81 ∗∗∗ 0.84 ∗∗∗ 0.60 ∗∗∗ 0.94 0.80 ∗∗∗
Hesse 0.97 ∗ 0.99 0.84 ∗∗∗ 1.03 1.00
Rhineland-Palatinate 1.12 ∗∗∗ 1.12 ∗∗∗ 0.99 1.15 1.15 ∗∗∗
Baden-W¨ urttemberg 0.96 ∗∗ 0.98 0.82 ∗∗∗ 0.93 0.95
Bavaria 1.23 ∗∗∗ 1.26 ∗∗∗ 1.20 ∗∗∗ 1.00 1.24 ∗∗∗
Saarland 0.76 ∗∗∗ 0.81 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗ 0.56 ∗∗ 0.62 ∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%REFERENCES 33
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